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APPELLEE'S FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH RULES Of APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE RULES 24. 26. AND 27. 
On May 13, 2009 an Order from the Utah Appellate Courtwas mailed to the Appellant 
and the Appellee's because Appellee's failed to submit the electronic courtesy brief to both the 
Utah Appellate Court and also to the Appellant. In addition to this Appellee's error, Appellee 
also filed with the Utah Appellate Court their response briefs bound with a spiral binding when 
the U.R.A.P. Rules specifically require a Velio binding. 
Appellee's counsels have been Officer's of the Court for several years, and should be 
held to the highest standards governing this Office. Pursuant to UR.A.P. Rule 27, failing to file 
and mail the electronic brief is considered untimely and therefore the Appellee's brief should be 
rejected. (Attached hereto as Exhibit A, Order). 
POINT II 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS ARE MOOT AND WITHOUTMERIT REGARDING 
NO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Richard's requested and audio or video transcript through the Recorder's Office, 
therefore this argument from the Appellee's is without merit and is moot. (See Exhibit A, and B, 
Appellant's Brief). Once again the Appellee's are trying to confuse the issues of the Court 
through smoke and mirrors just as they have throughout all of the proceedings. There is no audio 
or video to support issues and facts of the case of Summary Judgment in the amount of 
$53,656.58, (see Point V, infra.) which was the Summary Judgment which later became the 
basis for Attorney's Fees of $23,274.33. Richard's can only base the relevant facts of the case 
4 
from memory of Law and Motion in the court of Judge Stephen Henroid on April 14, 2008. 
Pursuant to Utah R. of Appellate Procedure Rule 54(a), Sufficiency of Evidence 
Supporting Findings or Conclusion; where an appellant intends to challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting finding of conclusion, "the appellant must include in the record of the 
transcript, of all evidence relevant to the challenged finding or conclusion", as in the cases of 
Child vs. Child UT Sup. Ct. No. 20081044, March 17,2009, and J.G. vs. State of Utah 2008 
UT App 439. 
POINT III 
APPELLEE'S RESPONSE WAS INADEQUATELY BREIFED. 
Appellee's filed a brief where over eighty percent of their case law did not support 
their arguments. Appellee's cited over fifty percent of their cases which represented criminal 
procedure instead of civil procedure and did not represent to the court their representation on 
criminal law and how it applies to this civil case. Pursuant to Utah R. Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 24(a)(9), "Supreme Court is not a depository in which appealing [parties] may dump 
burden of argument and research, State v. Brown 853 P.2d 851, (Utah 1993), (an applicable 
criminal case for this civil argument)."[Emphasis added]. This is outside the scope of civil 
law unless properly addressed to the court that criminal law does apply in this case. In 
addition to this error, the Appellee's Appendix was inadequately cited throughout their brief 
by only citing page numbers where many Exhibits within their Appendix contained the same 
page numbers. Pursuant to Clovdv. Clovd 2009 UT App 123, (May 7,2009), "To be 
properly briefed, an argument must provide reasoned analysis based on legal authority cited," 
Spencer v. Pleasant View City 2003 UT App 379, para. 20, 80 P.3d 546, Wall v. Wall 2009 
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UT App 129, (May 14, 2009), therefore, all arguments that have been cited in Appellee's 
brief should be disregarded. Attached hereto as Exhibit B, Appellee's cases which were not 
applicable to their arguments or cited pursuant civil procedure. 
POINT IV 
APPLLANT CANNOT PROPERLY ARGUE PROCEEDINGS. 
Counsel for Appellant is unable to argue issues presented in front of Judge Henroid's 
Court since Counsel was hired on Appeal and was not present at the proceedings in District 
Court hearings. In addition, counsel for the Appellant cannot properly argue the issues that 
Appellee's present in their Response because their was no transcript available to present any 
arguments which could only be presented as heresay by Appellant's counsel and Richard's. 
Richard's has only a transcript of the proceedings of the Order signed on 23 October 2008 
by Judge Christiansen which were set for decision on Attorney's Fees. This transcript is not a 
supporting document, since is it based on a judgment and support for attorney fees in Judge 
Henroid Court which Richard's is unable to support his facts and findings without a 
transcript. 
Richards went though the proper appellate procedures in ordering transcripts to back his 
appeal, to no avail, found through the Court Recorders Office there was no audio or video of the 
proceedings which supported a $76,930.91 judgment against him. 
Based on only hearsay by both parties, and having no audio or video record from the 
Court to present a proper appeal for Richard's case, the Court of Appeals should remand this case 
back for a new trial pursuant to Utah i?. Civil Procedure Rule 4-201, Record of Proceedings or 
pursuant to State v. Ruiz 2009 UT App 121, (May 7,2009), Utah R. App P. 35(c) the court also 
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has the right to make a final disposition of the cause without reargument. (citing a criminal case, 
applicable to this civil case). 
Appellant's counsel was not present to either hearings so Appellee's argument for 
attorney fees is irrelevant pursuant to Jensen v. Jensen 2009 UT App 1, (January 2,2009), 
"Attorney fees without entering findings on all of the necessary factors... has the right to be 
remanded for reconsideration of adequate findings on the award of attorney fees." Awarding 
attorney fees in Richard's case in not applicable without the proper facts and findings of the 
which have not been brought forward on appeal because there is no transcript to support the 
issues. 
POINT V 
IMPROPER JURISTICTION AND VENUE. 
Appellee's failed to argue this issue which Appellant brought up in their original brief 
with no supporting case law. The trial court failed to consider Juristion and Venue by not 
adhering to designated rules of procedure with Appellee being a Nevada based corporation and 
intertwined a lawsuit in California, therefore not domesticating it in Utah. 
In Judge Christiansen's Order against the Appellant there was no recognition of a foreign 
judgment, which was not properly registered and domesticated in the State of Utah from a 
California Court. Pursuant to Gardiner vs. York, 2006 UT App 496, Case No. 20051162-CA 
Gardiner domesticated the case in Utah and then went after York alleging that the transfer of the 
warehouse was fraudulent, just as in this case, since the Appellee's did not prevail to the point of 
satisfaction in California, they went after the Appellant in a fraudulent manner. Appellee's owed 
Richard's $55,000.00, and therefore tried to receive what was owed Richard's to go in their 
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favor since they could not get a satisfactory judgment in California. 
POINT VI 
APPELANT WAS NOT A PROFESSIONAL PRO SE LITIGANT. 
Appellee's improperly cited the case of Nelson v. Jacobsen 669 P.2d 1207,1213 (Utah 
1983), which is actually in favor and in support of Appellant, "A Layman is entitled to undertake 
his own representation, but due to his lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure, he 
should be accorded every consideration.. .of a layman's decision to function in a capacity for 
which he was not trained..." Not only does this case apply to Appellant and not Appellee's, 
Appellant's case of Lundahl v Quinn, 2003 UT 11/4,67 P.3d 1000, sets precedence over id. 
Richard's is a. pro se litigant and should have some leniency Lundahl v Qvinn, 2003 UT 
11/4,67 P.3d 1000, whereby leniency should be granted when apro se litigant is required or 
forced into representing himself in a Court of Law. Richard's filed to protect his interest and 
objected to the proceeding and protected his right to appeal these decisions. If Richard's would 
have been afforded Due Process this case would not be presented on appeal today. 
POINT VII 
APPELANT^ CASES STATE PRECEDENCE OVER APPELLEE'S. 
Appellee's cases should be stricken, not only for not supporting the issues, raised on 
appeal, but for old case law that is not relevant to this case. Appellant's case law set's precedence 
to the case law presented by the Appellee's. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case n^eds to be vacated or just supported by Appellant's brief based on the 
inadequately briefed response by Appellee's, and based on the fact that this is a foreign 
judgment which has not been domesticated in I Ttah which does not follow the Utah R.of 
Civil Procedure regarding proper jurisdiction and venue of these civil proceedings.. Tn the 
alternative this case should be reversed and remanded, back for new trial based upon no 
transcript available to support Richard's appeal for evidence supporting findings* facts, and 
conclusion of law. 
Dated this 26 t h day of May 2009. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
^ayne ^N^Searle 
Attorney for Appellant 
Counsel for the Appellant 
I certify that on this 26th day of May 2009,1 personally placed a true and correct copy of 
the "Appellant's Reply Brief, in a sealed envelope. I further placed the same in the United 
States Postal Service and addressed it to the following: 
Ronald S. George 
Law Offices of Ronald S- George P,A 
218WPaxtonAve. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Delano S. Findlay 
Attorney at Law 
648 East Vine Street, Suite #3 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Signature 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
_. 00O00 
riLED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY 1 3 2009 
Resource Technics, LLC; 
Resource Concepts, LLC; 
Ronald S, George; Lynn 
P. Heward; N. Enos Heward; 
and Interphase Corp., 
Pldiiliir dnd Appellees. 
Gene M. Richards, 
Respondent and Appellant, 
OKDlilR 
Appellate Case No, 20080910-CA 
Before JudgQs Bench^ Davis, and Mcllugh. 
Appellee failed to submit the electronic courtesy brief 
required under Otah Supreme Court Standing Order No* 8 within 
fourteen days after the filing of the printed brief. Please be 
advised that within seven (7) days from the date of this order/ 
you must submit to the court, a copy of appellee's brief on 
compaci: disc in searchabie PDF format or a motion stating good 
cause to be excused from complying with Utah Supreme Court 
Standing Order No. 8. The courtesy bii^I must be accompanied by 
certificate of service. 
Dated t h i s \t day of May, 2009, 
FOR THE 
James 7,. Davis^Judge 
EXHIBIT B 
APPELLEE'S CASE LAW NOT APPLICABLE TO 
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED IN RESPONSE BRIEF. 
Armstrong v. Department of Employment Security, 834 P.2d 562 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) 
Hart v. Salt lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App 1998) 
Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753, 2002 UT App 109 (Utah App. 2002) 
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854 n. 1 (Utah 1992) 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
Treffv. Hinkley, 2001 UT 50, 26 P.3d 212 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1169 n. 6 (Utah 1988) 
ALL OTHER CASE LAW PRESENTED IN APPELLEE'S 
RESPONSE BRIEF IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE 
APPELLANT'S CASE LAW SET'S PRECEEDENCE OVER THE 
OLD CASE LAW PRESENTED ON APPEAL IN APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF: 
Lundahl v. Quinn, 67 P.3d 1000, 2003 UT 11 (Utah 1998) (Utah 2003) 
EXHIBIT C 
2009 UT 17 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter* 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Cathy Child, No. 20081044 
Petitionee, 
v. 
F I L E D 
David N. Child, 
Respondent, March 17, 20 09 
Seventh District, Price Dep't 
The Honorable Bruce K. Halliday 
No. 024700194 
Attorneys: Rodney R. Parker, Salt Lake City, for petitioner 
Joane Pappas White, Price, for respondent 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
PER CURIAM: 
111 This matter is before the court upon a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, filed on December 22, 2008, 
52 The petition is granted only as to the following 
question: 
Whether the court of appeals erred in awarding Respondent 
"the full value of his 25% share in the [family rental] 
business" without remanding for an opportunity to make 
findings to support the district court's decision, 
53 As to the limited issue described by this question, we 
summarily reverse and remand. The court of appeals stated a 
sufficient basis for reversal of the district court's decision 
for a lack of findings, but it did not adequately support the 
additional step of declaring that the identified exceptions to 
the general rule excluding premarital property from the marital 
estate had not been established. It appears the latter 
conclusion could only be predicated on a distinct appellate 
determination that (1) the arguments or evidence presented to the 
district court were# as a matter of law, insufficient to invoke 
or establish one of the exceptions, or (2) the district court 
acted within its discretion in declining to make findings because 
it properly deemed the arguments or evidence insufficient to 
justify distinct findings as to an exception. If, on remand, the 
court of appeals is unable to make such an additional 
determination to support the result it reached, the matter should 
be remanded to the district court to provide findings to justify 
or correct the result that court originally reached. 
Accordingly, we remand to the court of appeals to take the action 
it deems appropriate according to the directives described in 
this order. 
No. 20081044 2 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00-—— 
Dalene S. Cloyd, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) (Not For Official Publication) 
Petitioner and Appellee, ) 
v. ) 
) (May~77 2009) 
Timothy A. Cloyd Sr., ) ; 
Respondent and Appellant. ) 
Case No. 20080357-CA 
F I L E D 
2009 UT App 123 
Second District, Morgan Department, 974500042 
The Honorable Michael G. Allphin 
Attorneys: Timothy A. Cloyd Sr., Clearfield, Appellant Pro Se 
Brad C. Smith, Ogden, for Appellee 
Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Orroe. 
PER CURIAM: 
Timothy A. Cloyd Sr. appeals from the trial court's orders 
entered March 19, 2008. We affirm. 
Briefing standards are provided in rule 24 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 24. An appellate 
brief must contain, among other things, a statement of the issues 
for review, including the standard of review for each issue and a 
record citation showing that each issue was preserved for appeal. 
See icL. R. 24(a)(5). In addition, a statement of facts relevant 
to the issues on appeal must be provided along with citations to" 
the record to support the facts asserted^ See Td^ *. •Tt{*){•!) ' 
A bnet must also contain argument specifically setting forth the 
contentions and reasons of an appellant regarding the issues 
presented and including citations to relevant legal authority. 
^ ^ i*h R^ 24(a)(9), JV party challenging a finding of fact must 
.marshal the evidence in support of thai finding. See id~—Tol^ 
properly^.riefecrran argument must provide reasoned analysis 
Mr cloyd;s briefing fails in all these respects. His 
tat?^9^ i! incomprehensible and apparently unrelated to his 
actual case. The stated issues challenge alimony and marital 
property distribution, which issues were resolved by stipulation 
in 2001. There is no fact section and no citations to the 
record. There is no attempt to make any relevant point tied to 
the facts of this case* His reply brief fares no better. It 
contains allegations unsupported by the record, maligns thp trial 
court, goes beyond the scope of a reply brief, and fails to 
present any reasoned argument. It is well established that 
appellate cqyrts will not address issues inadequately tvrigijgd-
See MacflKav v» Hardy, 973 £,2d 941, 948 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, 
the trial court's orders are affirmed-
— ^ _ i i i i i — -
Dalene Cloyd requests that sanctions be imposed under rule 
33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because Mr, Cloyd\e 
appeal is frivolous. See Utah R. App. P. 33, MiAouglijMEL. 
decline to award sanctions, costs are aw^ rri^ d piirczi-,ar^-h ..4-n mio IA 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, See id. R. 34. 
Additionally, because Ms, Cloyd was awarcfled^attorney,fees below, 
she is entitled to them on appeal,See valcarce v, Fitzgerald, 
H6i"»:2a jus,"Jiii iutah i^ysy: 
The trial court's orders are affirmed and this matter is 
remanded for a determination of costs and reasonable attorney 
fees. 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory K, Orme, Judge 
2QQ80357-CA 2 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Richard Gardiner, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Betty York and Interport, 
Inc., 
Defendants and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20051162-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 14, 2006) 
2006 UT App 496| 
Fourth District, Fillmore Department, 016700050 
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre Jr. 
Attorneys: James K. Slavens, Fillmore, for Appellant 
A. Samuel Primavera, Riverton, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Thorne. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
fl Richard Gardiner appeals from the trial court's order 
denying his motion for attorney fees. In this case, we examine 
whether attorney fees incurred in pursuing a fraudulent transfer 
action are recoverable as consequential damages stemming from a 
prior breach of contract. Because we hold that the trial court 
failed to engage in the appropriate analysis of this issue, we 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 Gardiner obtained a judgment of $7182, plus interest and 
costs, against Interport, Inc. (Interport) for breach of 
contract. The breach of corn-rant suit was tried and decided in 
Virginia. Gardiner then domesticated the judgment in Utah. 
f3 While the Virginia action was underway, Interport's 
president, William York Jr., transferred Interport's only asset, 
"a warehouse in Delta, Utah/ to his parentsr William York Sr. and 
Betty York. After the judgment was domesticated, Gardiner filed 
a petition for relief in Utah against Interport and Betty York, l 
alleging that the transfer of the warehouse was fraudulent. 
Gardiner sought either a judgmentlieiT or avoidance of the 
transfer"! See Utah Code Ann. § 25-1T-8 (19^ _gJ (settljcTgHEorth the 
remedies of creditors who seek relief from debtors' fraudulent 
transfer of assets). The trial court entered a default judgment 
Against InterportT~after it failed to defend. A bench trial was" 
held with Betty York as the remaining defendant. The trial court 
found that Interport had transferred the warehouse with the 
intent to defraud Gardiner and authorized a judgment lien aqajjo^ t^  
the property.2 
f4 Gardiner then filed a motion to recover the attorney fees he 
incurred in pursuing the fraudulent transfer litigation. The 
trial court denied the motion. When the trial court denied 
Gardiner's motion to reconsider the attorney fee ruling, he 
appealed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f5 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in 
denying Gardiner's request for attorney fees. Whether attorney 
fees should be awarded is a legal issue that we review for 
correctness. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 
1998). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Trial Court's Decision 
f6 Gardiner requested an award of attorney fees at the 
conclusion of trial. The trial court denied the motion, 
reasoning that there was "no basis[,] either statutory or 
contractual[,] why the fees should be awarded." Gardiner then 
filed a motion to reconsider,3 clarifying that his argument for 
1. William York Sr. passed away during this time and was not a 
party to the fraudulent transfer action. 
2. Betty York appealed the trial court's ruling that the 
transfer was fraudulent. We affirmed the trial court's decision 
in Gardiner v. York, 2006 UT App 433 (mem.) (per curiam). 
3. Although postjudgment motions to reconsider are no longer 
valid, see Gillett v. Price. 2006 UT 24,ff7-8, 135 P.3d 861, we 
consider the denial of the motion to reconsider here because the 
(continued...) 
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attorney fees was based on the "third-party litigation exception" 
to the general rule that attorney fees are only recoverable when 
authorized by statute or contract. In his memorandum in support 
of his motion to reconsider, Gardiner cited Macris & Associates 
v. Newavs, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, 60 P.3d 1176, and Collier v. 
Heinz, 827 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), for the principle that 
attorney fees may be recoverable as consequential damages in the 
limited situation where the defendant's breach of contract4 
foreseeably caused the plaintiff to incur attorney fees in 
litigation with a third party. See Macris, 2002 UT App 406 at 
ff13-14; Collier, 827 P.2d at 983-84. The trial court, however, 
again denied attorney fees, this time stating that 
[Gardiner] . . . cites the [c]ourt to the 
case of rCollier 1 for the proposition that 
there is a "third party exception" to the 
general rule that a court should not award 
attorney[] fees unless there is a statutory 
or contractual basis to do so. The [c]ourt 
finds the Collier decision to be limited only 
to the situation where an insurer breaks its 
contract with an insured, which is not the 
situation in the present case. 
Although the trial court correctly noted that Collier identified 
a right to attorney fees that is unique to the insurance context, 
it confused that rule with the more general third-party 
litigation exception. See 827 P.2d at 984. "Under the third-
party attorney fee[] exception, only the fees incurred in 
litigation with the third party are recoverable as consequential 
damages." Id. at 983-84. Attorney fees may not be awarded under 
the third-party litigation exception when the litigation for 
which fees are sought is between the contracting parties. See 
id. at 984. 
3. ( . . .continued) 
motion was made before Gillett was issued, see Radakovich v. 
Cornaby, 2006 UT App 454,117 & n.4 (noting Gillett was to be 
applied prospectively). 
4. Although this opinion refers to the third-party litigation 
exception only in the context of contract law, the exception also 
applies in tort law. See South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 
1279, 1282 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("[W]hen the natural consequence 
of one's negligence is another!s involvement in a dispute with a 
third party, attorney fees reasonably incurred in resolving the 
dispute are recoverable from the negligent party as an element of 
damages."). 
20051162-CA 3 
17 The Collier court, however, noted that the Utah Supreme 
Court in Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 
1989), carved out a separate exception in circumstances where an 
insurer breached a contract with an insured. See 827 P.2d at 
984-85. In such direct actions between an insured and his 
insurer, attorney fees incurred in that action can be recovered. 
See Bracey, 781 P.2d at 420; Collier, 827 P.2d at 984. The 
insurance case rule, however, is distinct from the exception that 
allows the recovery of fees incurred in third-party litigation if 
the fees are consequential damages of the breach. The Collier 
court explained: "The award of attorney fees as consequential 
damages, outside the context of statutory and contractual 
authorization, should be limited to . . . two situations . . . : 
insurance contracts and the third-party exception ." 827 P.2d at 
984 (emphasis added); cf. Puqh v. North Am. Warranty Servs.f 
Inc., 2000 UT App 121,121 & n.7, 1 P.3d 570 (awarding attorney 
fees in a breach of insurance contract case but noting that the 
insurance contract exception should not be expanded beyond "the 
realm of contracts fairly characterized as insurance contracts"). 
f8 The Collier court ultimately concluded that an award of 
attorney fees was inappropriate in that case because neither the 
third-party litigation exception nor the insurance contract 
exception applied. See 827 P.2d at 985. There, the attorney 
fees were incurred in a direct action between the contracting 
parties and the contract at issue was a settlement agreement 
rather than an insurance contract. See id. at 984-85. Here, the 
trial court's decision on Gardiner's motion to reconsider focused 
solely on the insurance case exception, despite the fact that the 
third-party litigation exception and the insurance contract 
exception are separate and distinct concepts. In this case, 
Gardiner and Interport were the contracting parties, and Gardiner 
sued a third party, Betty York, in the fraudulent transfer 
litigation.5 Thus, although the trial court correctly rejected 
the insurance exception, it erred in failing to analyze whether 
the third-party litigation exception warranted an award of 
attorney fees. 
II. The Third-Party Litigation Exception 
as Applied to This Case 
f9 On appeal, Gardiner argues that he is entitled to an award 
of attorney fees because Interport's actions caused him to incur 
those fees in obtaining a judgment lien against the warehouse. 
5. As noted, Interport was originally a defendant in the 
fraudulent transfer action, but after Interport failed to defend, 
the trial court entered a default judgment against Interport and 
the case went to trial against Betty York only. 
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In his brief, Gardiner argues primarily that Interport's 
fraudulent transfer was the wrongful act that caused him to 
engage in litigation with Betty York.6 We reiterate that the 
third-party litigation exception "allows recovery of attorney 
fees as consequential damages, but only in the limited situation 
where the defendant's breach of contract foreseeably caused the 
plaintiff to incur attorney fees through litigation with a third 
party." Collier, 827 P.2d at 983 (emphasis added); see also 
Lewiston State Bank v. Greenline Equip., L.L.C. , 2006 UT App 
446,1121 (noting that the Utah Supreme Court "has allowed an award 
of attorney fees as consequential damages arising from a breach 
of contract, but only in limited contexts"). Therefore, attorney 
fees are recoverable under this exception only if they are caused 
by and are a foreseeable result of the original breach of 
contract, not a subsequent wrongful act. 
110 In Maoris & Associates v. Neways, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, 60 
P. 3d 1176, this court considered the third-party litigation 
exception under circumstances similar to those at issue here. 
Plaintiff Macris originally filed suit for breach of contract 
against Images and Attitude, Inc. See id. at 12. Images 
subsequently sold its assets to Neways. See id. at 14. While 
the breach of contract action was pending, Macris filed suit 
against Neways, claiming that the transfer of assets from Images 
to Neways was fraudulent and left Images with insufficient assets 
to satisfy any judgment that Images might be required to pay as a 
result of the breach of contract suit. See id. at 13,. Macris 
prevailed in the breach of contract suit and Neways 
International, Inc., a company separate from Neways, paid the 
judgment. See id. at 17. Neways then filed a motion for summary 
judgment in the fraudulent transfer suit, arguing that the suit 
was rendered moot by Neways International's payment of the 
judgment. See id. at 18. In response, Macris asserted that it 
was entitled to recover the attorney fees incurred in the 
fraudulent transfer action. See id. The trial court granted the 
motion for summary judgment, holding that attorney fees were not 
recoverable because the action arose under the Utah Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), which did not contain an express 
provision authorizing an award of attorney fees. See id. at 19. 
6. Gardiner asserts that "[the] fraudulent transfer necessitated 
the litigation against Betty York to void the transfer of, or to 
have a judgment lien on, the warehouse." At another point in his 
brief, Gardiner contends that "it was foreseeable that 
Interport's breach of contract and fraudulent conveyance to a 
third party would compel Gardiner to pursue action, thus 
incurring attorney[] fees, against Betty York in ordei: to collect 
on his Virginia judgment." 
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til This court reversed, reasoning that the UFTA was a 
codification of the common law and should be liberally construed. 
See id. at 116 ("»[U]nless displaced by [the UFTA], the 
principles of law and equity, including merchant law and the law 
relating to principal and agent, equitable subordination, 
estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, 
mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, 
supplement [the UFTA's] provisions.'" (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-6-11 (1998)). Thus, this court in Maoris held that "the 
third-party litigation exception is retained from common law and 
may be applied to causes of action that arise under [the] UFTA." 
Id. at If 17. 
112 Despite this court's holding that the failure of the UFTA to 
include an attorney fees provision did not necessarily bar an 
award of attorney fees under the third-party litigation 
exception, we nonetheless held that Macris had to demonstrate 
that the fraudulent transfer action was a natural consequence of 
Images's original breach of contract. See id. at U22. "[E]ven 
though Macris [was] entitled to seek attorney fees incurred in 
pursuing a UFTA claim using the third-party litigation exception, 
it [was] limited by the requirements of the exception." Id. at 
H18. Where the third-party litigation exception is at issue, and 
the cause of action for which attorney fees are sought arises 
under the UFTA, a party is not foreclosed from obtaining attorney 
fees merely because the UFTA contains no fee provision. However, 
to recover under the third-party litigation exception, the movant 
must show that the original breach of contract foreseeably caused 
it to incur attorney fees as consequential damages in the 
subsequent UFTA litigation with the third party. Cf. Collier v. 
Heinz, 827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah 1992). 
HI3 Gardiner, therefore, has the burden of demonstrating that it 
was foreseeable that Interport's breach of contract would subject 
him to attorney fees in the fraudulent transfer action against 
Betty York. Whether expenses are foreseeable and therefore 
recoverable as consequential damages flowing from a breach of 
contract is a question of fact appropriately resolved by the 
trial court. See Moore v. Energy Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141, 
1148 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). We therefore remand to the trial 
court for a determination of whether Gardiner's fees were a 
foreseeable result of Interport's breach of contract. However, 
"a brief discussion of [consequential damages and foreseeability] 
is appropriate as guidance for the trial court on remand." Armed 
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14,138, 70 P.3d 35. "[T]o 
provide guidance to the trial court on remand[,] . . . we simply 
set forth the applicable law." Id. at U41 (alterations and 
omission in original) (quotations and citation omitted). 
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f14 Consequential damages are "those reasonably within the 
contemplation off or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at 
the time the contract was made."7 Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 
701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985); see also Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 
104,130, 990 P.2d 933 ("To prove consequential damages, a 
claimant must not only show a causal link between the breach and 
the subsequent injury, but he must also show that the injury was 
reasonably foreseeable or reasonably contemplated by the parties 
at the time the contract was entered into."). 
IF 15 In Pacific Coast Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co., 1 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d 906 (1958), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed foreseeability in analyzing the precise 
question in this case—whether attorney fees expended in an 
action against a third party were recoverable as consequential 
damages of an original breach. In Pacific Coast, the contractor 
failed to pay its subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen. See 
id. at 907. As a result, they filed liens against the homes 
under construction. See id. Plaintiff Pacific Coast, which was 
responsible for keeping title to the properties unencumbered, 
defended against the foreclosure of the liens. After settling 
with the subcontractors, Pacific Coast filed suit against the 
contractor's performance bond to recover the attorney fees and 
costs incurred. See id. The supreme court acknowledged that 
generally attorney fees are not recoverable absent statutory or 
contractual authorization, but nonetheless awarded them to 
Pacific Coast as consequential damages. See id. The supreme 
court set forth principles of foreseeability, stating that 
to be compensable, the loss must result from, 
the breach in the natural and usual course of 
events, so that it can fairly and reasonably 
be said that if the minds of the parties had 
averted to breach when the contract was made, 
loss of such character would have been within 
their contemplation. 
Id. The court then reasoned that the award of attorney fees to 
Pacific Coast was appropriate because it was foreseeable that the 
contractor's failure to pay the workers "would bring about the 
series of events" that occurred, including the filing of liens 
and Pacific Coast's retention of attorneys to defend against 
foreclosure. Id. at 908; see also Fleck v. National Prop. Mgmt., 
Inc., 590 P.2d 1254, 1255 (Utah 1979) (refusing to award 
consequential damages because it was not foreseeable that 
7. By contrast, "general damages" are "those flowing naturally 
from the breach." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 701 P.2d 795, 801 
(Utah 1985). 
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defendant's failure to improve subdivision lots would bring about 
loss of plaintiffs' down payment on lots, since plaintiffs lost 
title to lots through foreclosure of preexisting trust deeds). 
1116 With these principles in mind, the trial court must 
determine whether it was reasonably foreseeable, at the time that 
Gardiner and Interport contracted, that Interport's breach of 
contract would cause Gardiner to incur attorney fees in the 
fraudulent transfer action against Betty York. If the trial 
court concludes that the attorney fees were foreseeable and that 
they resulted from Interport's breach, then the fees are 
awardable as consequential damages under the third-party 
litigation exception. If, however, the likelihood of an action 
under the UFTA in the event of breach was not within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting, or there 
was no causal link between the fees and the breach, no award of 
attorney fees is appropriate under the third-party litigation 
exception. See Collier v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Moore, 814 P.2d at 1147-48. 
CONCLUSION 
1117 Although the trial court correctly concluded that the 
insurance case exception was unavailable to support an award of 
attorney fees, it erred by failing to analyze whether Gardiner's 
fees are recoverable under the third-party litigation exception. 
We remand to the trial court for a determination of whether the 
attorney fees Gardiner incurred in pursuing the fraudulent 
transfer action were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
Interport's breach. 
If 18 Reversed and remanded. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
If 19 WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Orme, 
PER CURIAM: 
J.G„ (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights 
in B.C.G. In his petition on appeal, Father asserts there was^ 
insufficient evidence to support the termination. However, he 
has failed to provide this court with an adequate record to 
review his claim, and thus, the trial court's order must be 
affirmed. 
Pursuant to rule 54(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, where an appellant intends to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding or conclusion, 
"the appellant must include in the record a transcript of all 
evidence relevant to" the challenged finding or conclusion. Utah 
R. App. p. 54(a). Father has failed to provide the transcript of 
his termination trial, in contravention of rule 54, In the 
absence of an adequate record on appeal, we cannot reach the 
issues raised and must presume the correctness of the 
disposition. See State v. Miller, 718 P*2d 403, 405 (Utah 1996) 
(per curiam). 
Accordingly, the termination of Father's parental rights is 
affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood/ 
Pr«bldiny Judge 
William A. Thome Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Gregory K, Orme, Judge 
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Kae JENSEN, Petitioner and Appellee, 
v. 
David Leon JENSEN, Respondent and Appellant. 
No. 20061164-CA. 
Jan. 2, 2009. 
Background: Husband appealed from decision of 
the Sixth District Court, Richfield Department, 
David L. Mower, J., awarding wife one-half of the 
increase in equity of closely held corporation, 
which employed husband, and awarding wife attor-
ney fees. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, P.J., 
held that: 
(1) because husband did not own all of closely held 
corporation, corporation's total increase in equity 
was not available for distribution as a marital asset; 
and 
(2) wife was not entitled to one-half of the in-
creased equity in closely held corporation, which 
employed husband. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Orme, J., concurred specially and filed opinion. 
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FN1 Before GREENWOOD, P.J., and BILLINGS 
and ORME, JJ. 
FN1. Judge Billings acted on this case pri-
or to her retirement on Dec. 31, 2008. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
1f 1 David Leon Jensen (Husband) appeals from the 
trial court's Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, arguing that the trial court 
erred by awarding Kae Jensen (Wife) one-half of 
the increase in equity of A & D Contractors, Inc. (A 
& D) and by awarding Wife attorney fees without 
entering findings on all of the necessary factors. 
We reverse the trial court's award of one-half of the 
increased equity in A & D to Wife and reverse and 
remand for reconsideration of and adequate find-
ings on the award of attorney fees to Wife. 
BACKGROUND 
If 2 Husband and Wife were married for seventeen 
years and had one child together. They were di-
vorced in July 2005, pursuant to a bifurcated decree 
and subsequently participated in a three-day trial 
addressing the division of property and debt. 
H 3 At the close of trial, the court found that Hus-
band was employed by A & D, a closely held cor-
poration, throughout the parties' marriage. The trial 
court also found that Wife was the primary 
"homemaker and caretaker" of the parties' child. 
From 1991 forward, Wife worked part-time as a 
beautician and massage therapist. At the time of tri-
al, Wife was operating a massage therapy and cos-
metology business out of the parties' residence. 
T[ 4 Regarding A & D, the trial court found that the 
corporation was organized in 1967 by Husband's 
father and uncles. Through a series of transactions, 
Husband became the owner of up to half of the cor-
poration's issued shares. In addition, the trial court 
found that from at least 2001, A & D's corporate 
tax returns indicated that Husband and his brother, 
Mark, each owned fifty percent of the corporation; 
the two brothers "ha[d] been in charge of the 
[corporation since the death of their father"; Hus-
band was listed on various stock certificates as 
owning fifty percent of A & D's stock; and Hus-
band was the president of the corporation. The trial 
court also noted that Husband's mother testified that 
she owned A & D stock, but had assigned her in-
terest in that stock to her two sons, and the assign-
ment "would become a full transfer upon her 
death." The trial court also found that over the 
course of the *1022 parties' marriage, A & D's 
equity increased by $230,851. 
If 5 Based on these findings, the trial court awarded 
Husband all the stock he "owns in A & D ... be-
cause it is his separate property acquired by gift." 
" The court also ordered that the entire $230,851 
increase in A & D's equity "should be divided 
between the parties. It is marital property because 
{Wife] has contributed to such increase by taking 
upon herself the household responsibilities and care 
of the child." The court also ordered Husband to 
pay Wife's attorney fees in the amount of 
$12,562.50. Husband appeals. 
FN2. Actually, according to Husband's 
testimony, Husband acquired part of his 
stock by purchase funded by A & D des-
pite Husband's written agreement to pay 
for the stock himself. 
ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
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spouse to preserve or augment the asset," as com-
pared to situations where there is a "lack of such ef-
forts." 760 P.2d at 306. 
U 15 In the case before us, the trial court found that 
Wife "was the primary homemaker and caretaker of 
[the parties' child]." Wife "has a beautician license 
and a massage therapist license" and "began work-
ing as [a] massage therapist in December of 1991." 
Wife "contributed to family finances by operating 
massage therapy and cosmetology businesses" in 
part of the parties' home. Based on these findings, 
the trial court concluded Wife should be awarded 
part of the increased equity in A & D, stating, "It is 
marital property because [Wife] has contributed to 
such increase by taking upon herself the household 
responsibilities and care of the child." The trial 
court then made several offsets to the respective 
awards of equity. 
f 16 The court's findings regarding Wife's contribu-
tions to A & D's equity are inadequate to justify the 
award. They are vastly different in character and 
quantity than those found to justify an award in our 
recent case law. Wife did not assist in running the 
business nor contribute in any way to its increase in 
equity. Moreover, it is unclear whether the increase 
in equity was due to anything other than inflation. 
See Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) 
(rejecting claim to appreciation of spouse's separate 
property, in part because the added value "came 
solely from the effects of inflation"). Wife behaved 
in a very normal and commendable manner by 
caring for the parties' child, maintaining the house-
hold, and running her own part-time business from 
their home. More is required, however, to justify an 
award of Husband's separate property. 
If 17 We note that Wife did not seek an award of the 
equity in A & D based on Mortens en's second cir-
cumstance, requiring extraordinary situations. See 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. At trial, Wife argued 
that an award of an interest in A & D was justified 
either because the property had been commingled 
or because she had contributed sufficiently to its 
operation and success. In addition, the trial court 
Page 8 
made no findings that would justify the award on 
that basis. Thus, it differs from Kunzler, where the 
majority of this court held that the wife had ad-
equately preserved the issue of an equitable award 
because of extraordinary situations and the facts 
were supportive of that theory. See Kunzler, 2008 
UT App 263, ffi[ 33, 37, 190 P.3d 497. Therefore, 
we reverse the trial court's award to Wife of one-
half of the increased equity in A & D and remand 
for reconsideration of other aspects of the divorce 
decree that may need to be adjusted in light of our 
decision. 
II. Attorney Fees 
[11] f^ 18 Husband also argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees 
without analyzing certain necessary factors. As this 
court has recognized, when awarding attorney fees 
in divorce cases, the trial court is required to make 
explicit findings regarding "the financial need of 
the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse 
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
fees." Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 
11, U 49, 176 P.3d 476 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). While Wife admits that "the trial court 
did not make any explicit findings to support its 
award of attorney[ ] fee[s]," she argues that the 
court's findings on the aforementioned factors can 
be implied from the record. In this case, the court 
acknowledged that Husband makes more money 
than Wife, but it made no findings on Husband's 
ability to pay Wife's attorney fees or on the reason-
ableness of the fees incurred. Moreover, the record 
is not adequate to imply findings on the omitted 
factors. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's 
attorney fee award and remand for reconsideration 
and entry of sufficient findings of fact thereon. 
CONCLUSION 
f 19 The trial court's property award of equity in A 
& D is based on insufficient findings of fact regard-
ing ownership of the corporation and appears to 
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Rehearing Denied April 1, 2003. 
Pro se litigant sought to intervene in underlying 
collections action. The District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Anthony B. Qumn, J., refused to address 
litigant's legal filings. Litigant petitioned for ex-
traordinary writ. The Supreme Court held that: (1) 
when an individual avails herself of the judicial ma-
chinery as a matter of routine, special leniency on 
the basis of pro se status is manifestly inappropri-
ate; (2) litigant would no longer be afforded reason-
able indulgence; (3) litigant's petition was frivolous 
on its face; and (4) real parties in interest were en-
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45TI Retainer and Authority 
45k62 k. Rights of Litigants to Act in Person 
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When an individual avails herself of the judicial 
machinery as a matter of routine, special leniency 
on the basis of pro se status is manifestly inappro-
priate, particularly when the filings in question are 
routinely frivolous and have been brought with the 
apparent purpose, or at least effect, of harassment, 
not only of opposing parties, but of the judicial ma-
chinery itself. 
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Pro se litigant who had history of filing numerous 
pro se actions would no longer be afforded reason-
able indulgence, and thus, litigant would be charged 
with full knowledge and understanding of all relev-
ant statutes, rules, and case law, where litigant had 
chosen to make legal self-representation a full-time 
hobby, if not a career. 
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ing extraordinary writ allowing her to intervene in 
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Pro se litigant's petition for extraordinary writ, re-
questing an order directing trial court to allow her 
to intervene as a matter of right in underlying col-
lections action, failed to comply with requisite 
standard for asserting such a petition, and thus, pe-
tition was frivolous on its face; rule governing sub-
stitution of parties provided proper mechanism, if 
any, for litigant to obtain relief she requested, and 
litigant did not document basis in law for bringing 
such a petition nor did she even purport to argue in 
favor of a good faith extension or modification. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 25(c), 65B(a). 
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2871V New Parties and Change of Parties 
287k57 Substitution 
287k58 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Courts cannot be compelled to recognize a substitu-
tion of parties at the whim of the movant. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 25(c). 
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Provision in rule governing substitution of parties 
that the action "may be continued by or against the 
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manage the case without undue disruption, confu-
sion, or interference. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 25(c). 
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Rule requiring actions to be brought in the name of 
a real party in interest and prohibiting dismissal of 
action on ground that it was not prosecuted in name 
of real party in interest until court had appropriately 
examined the issue was inapplicable to pro se litig-
ant's request to intervene in undei lying collections 
action as a matter of right for purposes of pursuing 
counterclaim, where there was no question that 
counterclaims were initially brought in name of a 
real party in interest and basis for dismissal of law-
suit had nothing to do with litigant's belated asser-
tion that she should be allowed to intervene. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 17(a). 
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102k66 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
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102 VIII Attorney Fees 
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tion. Most Cited Cases 
Pro se litigant's frivolous petition for extraordinary 
relief, requesting an order directing trial court to al-
low her to intervene as a matter of right in underly-
ing collections action, entitled real parties in in-
terest to attorney fees and double costs for defend-
ing such petition. Rules App.Proc, Rule 33(c)(1); 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(a). 
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Ordinarily, where litigants cannot afford to pay a 
filing fee, that fee is waived so that poverty will not 
create a de facto barrier to access to the courts. 
*1001 Holli Lundahl, petitioner pro se. 
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Judge Quinn. 
Ronald F. Price, Salt Lake City, for N.A.R., Mark 
Olson, Olson & Associates, Anthony Tidwell, 
Olympus View Dental Center. 
PER CURIAM: 
| 1 This matter comes before the court on petition 
for extraordinary writ. The petitioner, Holli 
Lundahl, asserts she has filed a motion to intervene 
and an amended counterclaim complaint on which 
the district court refused to rule because it deemed 
her a nonparty to the action. Judge Anthony Quinn 
filed a response, as did N.A.R. Inc., Mark T. Olson, 
Olson & Associates, P.C., Anthony Tidwell, 
D.D.S., and Olympus View Dental Center as real 
parties in interest. We deny the petition and further 
hold that it is frivolous. 
| 2 As background to this court's order on this peti-
tion, a brief recitation of the history of petitioner's 
many appearances before this court is appropriate. 
Since 1999, Holli Lundahl has submitted no 
fewer than twenty-seven filings, consisting of nine-
teen appeals, four petitions for extraordinary writ 
(including the instant petition), two petitions for 
writ of certiorari, and two petitions for inter-
locutory appeal. Of these, five appeals are presently 
pending before either this court or the court of ap-
peals, " two decisions on appeal were summarily 
affirmed, one decision on appeal has been affirmed 
per curiam, four appeals were dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction (including Holli's attempt to appeal a 
criminal case where the lower court had dismissed 
the charges against her), two appeals were dis-
missed as premature, one appeal was dismissed for 
an improper rule 54(b) certification, and one appeal 
was voluntarily dismissed. Three petitions for ex-
traordinary writ, two petitions for writ of certiorari, 
and two petitions for interlocutory appeal have been 
denied. 
FN1. Because this matter was originally 
brought as a counterclaim by Holli 
Lundahl's sister, Kelli Lundahl, we gener-
ally will refer to them by their first names 
to avoid confusion. 
FN2. Four of the nineteen appeals noted 
above were consolidated into a single ac-
tion, leaving sixteen separate appeals for 
disposition. 
t 3 In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 
(Utah 1983), this court held that "as a general rule, 
a party who represents himself will be held to the 
same standard of knowledge and practice as any 
qualified member of the bar." Nevertheless, Nelson 
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also noted that " 'because of his lack of technical 
knowledge of law and procedure [a layman acting 
as his own attorney] should be accorded 
every* 1002 consideration that may reasonably be 
indulged.' " Id. (bracketed language in original) 
(quoting Ileathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 268, 
372P.2d990, 991 (1962)). 
[1][2] U 4 Accordingly, this court generally is leni-
ent with pro se litigants. Individuals have a right to 
represent themselves without being compelled to 
seek professional assistance. Where they are largely 
strangers to the legal system, courts are understand-
ably loath to sanction them for a procedural misstep 
here or there. Holli, however, is hardly a stranger to 
the legal system. Where most ordinary individuals 
find themselves in court on only a handful of occa-
sions in their lives, Holli has managed to embroil 
herself in more litigation in just a few short years 
than one would think humanly possible. When an 
individual avails herself of the judicial machinery 
as a matter of routine, special leniency on the basis 
of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate. 
[3] U 5 This is particularly true where the filings in 
question are routinely frivolous and have been 
brought with the apparent purpose, or at least ef-
fect, of harassment, not only of opposing parties, 
but of the judicial machinery itself. When Holli is 
unsuccessful in obtaining the relief she seeks, she 
has not infrequently resorted to collateral attack on 
the judges who have adjudicated her cases. Indeed, 
a significant number of the direct appeals Holli has 
filed have been brought from district court denials 
of petitions for extraordinary relief naming judges 
as defendants. Therefore, notwithstanding the 
dictum in Nelson cautioning courts to be lenient 
with pro se litigants, we now make clear that the 
reasonable indulgence that has been afforded to 
Holli in the past is at an end. Where Holli has 
chosen to make legal self-representation a full-time 
hobby, if not a career, it is not too much to expect 
her to strictly abide by the rules governing the ap-
pearances of parties before this court. Therefore, 
she shall be charged with full knowledge and un-
derstanding of all relevant statutes rules, and case 
law. 
\ 6 We also note Holli has occasionally employed 
the right to self-representation in a questionable 
manner. In this petition, as well as in at least three 
other recent appellate filings, Holli has purportedly 
acquired another person's cause of action by assign-
ment and then has professed to represent that cause 
of action in her own right. J The Utah State Bar 
Rules of Integration and Management do not 
"prohibit a person who is unlicensed as an attorney 
at law ... from personally representing that person's 
own interests in a cause to which the person is a 
party." Utah State Bar R. Integration and Manage-
ment R. Ill(T). However, this exception to the pro-
hibition on the unauthorized practice of law is lim-
ited to actions where "the person is a party in his or 
her own right and not as an assignee." Id. 
(emphasis added). In this petition, Holli concedes 
the original cause of action belonged solely to Kelli 
Lundahl. On pages five and six of her petition, 
Holli asserts Kelli's counsel abandoned her on the 
morning of a hearing to determine a motion for 
summary judgment. Holli then states that "Kelli 
was unable to obtain other counsel willing to sue an 
attorney. Accordingly, Kelli assigned her property 
damage claims to Holli Lundahl." (Emphasis ad-
ded.) In other words, the expressed purpose of the 
assignment was to allow Holli to prosecute the ac-
tion because Kelli could not obtain a licensed attor-
ney. 
FN3. Lundahl v. Alta View Hospital, No. 
20020749; Lundahl v. Qwest Communica-
tions, No. 20020748; Lundahl v. IHC, No. 
20010336. The response to the instant peti-
tion also contains some very troubling al-
legations that Holli has appeared at hear-
ings and misrepresented herself as Kelli 
acting pro se. Respondents have attached 
an affidavit stating a person other than 
Kelli has appeared at hearings and repres-
ented herself as Kelli. We note that this af-
fidavit does not explicitly identify Holli 
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Lundahl as the person appearing; we also 
note some of the allegations are not sup-
ported by affidavit and are hearsay. We 
therefore make clear that they do not affect 
our decision today. 
FN4. Subsection 78-9-101(3) of the Utah 
Code contains substantially the same pro-
vision. Initially scheduled to be repealed 
on May 1, 2003, the repeal date has been 
extended to May 3, 2004. See H.B. 349 SI, 
2003 Gen. Sess. (Utah) (enacted). 
[4] 1f 7 We offer no ruling at this time regarding 
whether Holli has violated the proscription* 1003 
on the unauthorized practice of law. Nonetheless, it 
remains pertinent to our purposes here that she ac-
tually cited section 78-9-101 of the Utah Code in 
her petition and that she has been expressly in-
formed in the past that she cannot represent the leg-
al interests of other persons. Consequently, we 
deem any argument that attempts to distort legal au-
thority for the purpose of evading or circumventing 
the proscription against unlicensed practice as not 
brought in good faith. 
FN5. E.g., Lundahl v. Alta View Hospital, 
No. 20020749 (letter from court dated Oc-
tober 23, 2002). 
| 8Rule 33(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides: "[A] frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good 
faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse exist-
ing law." With this standard in mind, we turn to the 
present petition. The underlying collections action 
was commenced against Kelli as a defendant. The 
plaintiffs eventually agreed to dismiss the action 
with prejudice, apparently due to settlement of the 
claim. However, the case continued forward be-
cause Kelli elected to pursue a counterclaim against 
the plaintiff and other parties. On November 25, 
2002, the district court granted the counterclaim de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment and direc-
ted counsel to prepare the order. According to 
Holli's petition, Kelli assigned her claims on 
December 4, 2002. Holli asserts she then moved to 
FTsT6 intervene on December 6, followed by numer-
ous motions and objections. The counterclaim de-
fendants moved for attorney fees, and the district 
court scheduled a hearing on that matter. Appar-
ently, an order relating to the November 25 ruling 
was filed on December 27, and the hearing on attor-
ney fees was conducted on January 16, 2003. The 
transcript of the January 16, 2003, hearing before 
the district court indicates Kelli appeared and was 
represented by licensed legal counsel. It is not clear 
whether Holli was present at the hearing. The dis-
trict court indicated it would award a fixed amount 
of attorney fees and directed the counterclaim de-
fendants' counsel to prepare an order. The district 
court stated it would not address Holli's pleadings 
because she was not a party to the case. It also spe-
cifically stated it would not allow Holli to appear as 
a party unless she filed a motion for substitution 
pursuant to rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Holli then brought the instant petition, 
requesting an order directing the district court to al-
low her to intervene as a matter of right. 
FN6. The respondents to the petition dis-
pute whether this motion was actually 
filed. They assert Holli obtained a date-
stamped copy without leaving a copy for 
the district court. While these allegations 
are also troubling, resolution of the con-
flicting allegations is not material to our 
decision here. For the limited purpose of 
reviewing this petition, we will assume the 
motion to intervene was in fact filed. 
[5] If 9 Based on the documentation provided by the 
petition, it is not warranted by existing law. A 
petition for extraordinary writ may be brought only 
where "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
is available." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). While Holli 
acknowledges this standard, her petition manifestly 
fails to comply with it. 
FN7. The bulk of the allegations of fact in 
Holli's petition are argumentative, conclus-
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ory, or irrelevant. Because this court does 
not have access to the record, it must ne-
cessarily rely on those facts, and docu-
ments properly derived from that record 
and submitted as part of the petition to 
guide its determination of frivolousness. 
[6] [7][8] f 10 Where a chose in action is pur-
portedly conveyed after a legal action concerning it 
already has been filed by the original party in in-
terest, the assignee may be required to obtain a sub-
stitution of parties according to the dictates of rule 
25(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; specifically: 
"the action may be continued by or against the ori-
ginal party, unless the court upon motion directs the 
person to whom the interest is transferred to be sub-
stituted in the action." Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c). While 
rule 25(c) speaks in permissive rather than mandat-
ory terms, it is clear courts cannot be compelled to 
recognize a substitution of parties at the whim of 
the movant. See, e.g., Calder Bros. Co. v. Ander-
son, 652 P.2d 922, 927 n. 6 (Utah 1982) (upholding 
denial of motion for substitution of real party in in-
terest, where motion was filed subsequent to default 
judgment). *1004 The provision that the action 
"may be continued by or against the original party," 
unless the court grants a motion for substitution, 
preserves the court's inherent power to manage the 
case without undue disruption, confusion, or inter-
FN8 ference. See Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 561, 
252 P.2d 538, 539(1953). 
FN8. One of Holli's asserted justifications 
for seeking an extraordinary writ is her 
claim that the time for filing a notice of ap-
peal began to run on December 27, 2002. 
The real parties in interest, on the other 
hand, assert that order was not a final judg-
ment. Regardless, where a timely motion 
for attorney fees is interposed, the time for 
filing a notice of appeal does not begin to 
run until a final order fixing the amount of 
those fees is entered. See Promax Dev. 
Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, f 15, 998 P.2d 
254 ("[A] trial court must determine the 
amount of attorney fees awardable to a 
party before the judgmenl becomes final 
for purposes of appeal."); see also Sittner 
v. Schnever, 2000 UT 45, If 19, 2 P.3d 442. 
In this case, the final order on the motion 
for attorney fees had nol been filed at the 
time Holli submitted this petition, and, in 
any event, Holli's own failure to timely 
move for substitution does not create an 
emergency necessitating this court's inter-
vention. 
[9] f 11 Holli instead improperly moved to inter-
vene as a matter of right under rule 24(a). Rule 
24(a) grants a right to intervene, upon "timely ap-
plication," where the applicant "claims an interest 
relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action." Holli, howe\er, cannot claim 
an independent interest relating to either property 
or a transaction because the "transaction" at issue is 
the alleged conveyance of the chose in action itself. 
If courts were to countenance such subterfuges, it 
would confer an unconditional right to intervene on 
the entire universe of individuals or entities legally 
capable of accepting the assignment of a cause of 
action. 
FN9. Holli additionally relies on rule 17(a) 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 17(a) 
requires actions to be brought in the name 
of a real party in interest. It also prohibits 
dismissal of the action "on the ground that 
it is not prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest," until the court has appro-
priately examined the issue. This rule 
plainly is inapposite. There is no question 
the counterclaims initially were brought in 
the name of a real party in interest. Also, 
the basis for dismissal of the lawsuit had 
nothing to do with Holli's belated assertion 
that she should be allowed to intervene; in-
deed, the district court granted summaiy 
judgment before Holli received her purpor-
ted assignment. 
| 12 Consequently, the district court's justifiable re-
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fusal to address a multitude of last-ditch, disruptive 
legal filings was well within its discretion and sup-
ported by Holli's failure to avail herself of the pro-
cedural rule designed to afford her the relief she 
claimed. Holli has documented no basis in law for 
bringing a petition for extraordinary writ. Nor does 
she even purport to argue in favor of a good faith 
extension or modification. Instead, the legal analys-
is she presents in support of her petition is confined 
to a conclusory assertion that she has a statutory 
right to intervene, accompanied by several mani-
festly inapposite citations. Where rule 25(c) 
provided the proper mechanism, if any, for Holli to 
obtain the relief she requests, her petition for 
extraordinary relief is frivolous on its face. 
FN10. Since rule 38 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure allows the appellate 
court to independently determine proper 
substitution of parties, Holli would not 
have been deprived of her right to seek 
substitution even if she had brought a 
proper motion for substitution and the dis-
trict court had failed to rule on it prior to 
entry of final judgment. Assuming, without 
deciding, that a motion for substitution 
brought just prior to entry of final judg-
ment would not toll the time for filing a 
notice of appeal, the right to appeal would 
remain vested in Kelli, and Holli could em-
ploy rule 38 to pursue her claim of substi-
tution before the appellate court. 
[10] ^ 13 We therefore turn to the appropriate con-
sequence for filing a frivolous pleading. Rule 33(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
that "if the court determines that a motion made or 
appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or 
FN 11 for delay, it shall award just damages." Pur-
suant to this provision, the real-party-in-interest re-
spondents have requested costs and attorney fees. 
See Utah R. App. P. 33(c)(1). We hold N.A.R. Inc., 
Mark Olson, Olson & Associates, P.C., Anthony 
Tidwell, D.D.S., and Olympus View Dental Center 
are entitled to attorney fees and double costs for the 
time and resources expended in *1005 defending 
against this frivolous petition. We direct the district 
court to determine the amount of those sanctions 
and to take whatever other actions it deems appro-
priate within its jurisdictional authority. 
FN11. For purposes of this rule, "a motion 
made or appeal taken" necessarily includes 
all filings that are submitted to this court. 
Otherwise, parties would be excused from 
the consequences of filing a frivolous peti-
tion for discretionary review. 
[11] f 14 We also wish to address Holli's history of 
consuming judicial resources without demonstrat-
ing adequate legal justification. Although certain 
fees are assessed against parties who avail them-
selves of the services of the courts, the judiciary of 
this state is largely funded by the taxpayers. It 
stands to reason that Holli should not be allowed to 
harass the judiciary of this state at public expense. 
While this court does not deem it appropriate at this 
time to assess a fine specifically designed to com-
pensate the state for the resources Holli has con-
sumed with frivolous litigation, there remains the 
matter of filing fees. Ordinarily, where litigants 
cannot afford to pay a filing fee, that fee is waived 
so that poverty will not create a de facto barrier to 
access to the courts. Holli routinely has taken ad-
vantage of the affidavit of impecuniosity to obtain 
virtually cost-free access to this court. Under the 
unusual circumstances of this case, and in light of 
her previous multitude of filings, this court enters 
the following ruling directed to the Clerk of the 
Utah Supreme Court: In any future filing of a peti-
tion for discretionary review by Holli Lundahl, the 
Clerk shall allow only a conditional waiver of the 
filing fee. In the event Holli's pleadings violate rule 
33 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the condi-
tional waiver of the fee will be revoked and Holli 
Lundahl will be barred from submitting any future 
filing of a petition for discretionary review until the 
filing fee is paid. 
f 15 Furthermore, any motion for sanctions brought 
by an opposing party, or on the court's own motion, 
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Specifically, Holli shall not receive any leniency of 
treatment based merely on nominal pro se status. 
Other courts of this state may take note of our rul-
ing and respond appropriately. The courts of this 
state possess the powers necessary to maintain the 
orderly disposition of matters brought before them, 
including the power to levy sanctions and, in appro-
priate cases, to hold in contempt the parties who ap-
pear before them. 
f 16 In conclusion, we emphasize any prospective 
penalties will be applicable only to cases where 
Holli Lundahl fails to meet the threshold require-
ments of applicable laws and court rules. Any party 
who comes before the courts is obliged to abide by 
these in any event. Thus, the prospective portion of 
our ruling does not mandate sanctions per se, but 
merely constitutes a reminder and a warning that 
such sanctions are available and applicable. Holli 
Lundahl's privilege to access to the courts will be 
preserved in direct proportion to her willingness to 
accept the responsibilities accompanying that priv-
ilege. 
117 Justice PARRTSH does not participate herein. 
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award property that does not belong to Husband. 
Furthermore, the findings of fact do not support the 
trial court's conclusion that Wife contributed to the 
growth in equity sufficiently to entitle her to an 
award of any portion of the equity. *1026 We re-
verse the trial court's award of one-half of A & D's 
increased equity and remand for adjustments in oth-
er portions of the decree necessitated by this de-
cision. We also reverse and remand for reconsidera-
tion the trial court's attorney fee award in favor of 
Wife because the trial court failed to enter findings 
on all of the required factors. 
t 20 I CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, Judge.ORME, 
Judge (concurring specially): 
If 21 I agree with the analysis in Parts 1(B) and II of 
the lead opinion. I concur in the decision to remand 
the case so that the trial court can adjust its decree, 
if necessary, in light of our reversal of the award to 
Wife of the increased value of the equity in A & D. 
I also agree that, once this has been accomplished, 
the trial court should reconsider the award of attor-
ney fees in the context of making adequate factual 
findings on the required criteria. The primary focus 
will, necessarily, be on Wife's need for assistance 
in paying her attorney fees given the property divi-
sion and support provisions of the revised decree. 
f 22 I do not join in Part 1(A) of the lead opinion-
not so much because I disagree with the analysis 
but because it is completely unnecessary to reach 
the issue treated in Part 1(A) in view of our resolu-
tion in Part 1(B). In Part 1(B) we hold Wife has no 
claim on the increased value of the equity in A & D 
because her contributions to the marriage in child-
rearing and homemaking are not the kind of busi-
ness- or investment-related contributions envi-
sioned in the line of cases beginning with 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 
1988), as warranting an award of one spouse's sep-
arate property to the other spouse. Thus, it simply 
does not matter, in the posture of this case, whether 
Husband owns all or only some of the stock in A & 
D or whether the increased value identified by the 
trial court is attributable to all issued shares or only 
the shares held beneficially by Husband. I could see 
the need to opine on these matters if we held in Part 
1(B) that Wife had some claim on the equity in A & 
D and the question then arose as to what portion of 
A & D's equity actually belonged to Husband and 
was thus awardable, in whole or in part, to Wife. 
But Husband's ownership percentage just does not 
matter in this divorce proceeding once we hold 
Wife has no claim on any of the equity in A & D. 
f 23 The ownership interests of Husband, his broth-
er, and his mother may need to be sorted out among 
themselves, but no findings the trial court made in 
this regard are binding in any way on the brother, 
the mother, or the corporation, given that they were 
not parties. Accordingly, there is no reason for us to 
deal with the stock ownership issue beyond making 
this simple observation. 
Utah App.,2009. 
Jensen v. Jensen 
203 P.3d 1020, 620 Utah Adv. Rep. 56, 2009 UT 
App 1 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Brett W. NELSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Jeff JACOBSEN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 17667. 
Aug. 31, 1983. 
Action was instituted for alleged alienation of 
wife's affections. The Sixth District Court, Sanpete 
County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment for 
plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Oaks, J., held that: (1) notice of trial de-
scribed nature of proceedings against unrepresented 
defendant in such ambiguous terms that it deprived 
him of adequate time to prepare for his defense in 
violation of his right to due process; (2) an action 
for alienation of affections was still a viable cause 
of action in Utah, but in order for plaintiff to recov-
er, it was necessary to establish that causal effect of 
defendant's conduct outweighed combined effect of 
all other causes, including conduct of plaintiff and 
alienated spouse; (3) punitive damages were recov-
erable as long as plaintiff showed circumstances of 
aggravation in addition to malice implied by law 
from conduct of defendant in causing separation of 
plaintiff and his spouse; and (4) an award of punit-
ive damages could not be entered, however, without 
first adducing evidence or making findings of fact 
with regard to defendant's net worth or income. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hall, C.J., and Stewart, J., concurred in part and 
dissented in part and filed separate opinions. 
Durham, J., concurred in result and dissented in 
part and filed opinion. 
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Const. Amend. 14. 
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"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be 
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated 
to time, place, and circumstances, but is a concept 
which rests upon basic fairness and demands a pro-
cedure that is appropriate to case and just to parties 
involved. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
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(Formerly 92k314) 
Notice of trial given an unrepresented defendant in 
form of an oral statement that case had been set for 
"hearing" two weeks later was not a clear notice 
that defendant, who was uneducated and inexperi-
enced, had to be ready for "trial" on that date and, 
hence, was so ambiguous as to deprive defendant of 
adequate time to prepare his defense in violation of 
his constitutional right to due process. LT.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
[5] Attorney and Client 45 €=^62 
45 Attorney and Client 
4 5II Retainer and Authority 
45k62 k. Rights of Litigants to Act in Person 
or by Attorney. Most Cited Cases 
A layman is entitled to undertake his own repres-
entation, but due to his lack of technical knowledge 
of law and procedure, he should be accorded every 
consideration that may reasonably be indulged and, 
though this would not include interrupting course of 
proceedings to translate legal terms, explain legal 
rules, or otherwise attempting to redress ongoing 
consequences of layman's decision to function in a 
capacity for which he was not trained, it would in-
clude informing layman of date of trial more than 
two days before it was to begin and advising him of 
such matters as his right to a trial by jury and right 
to require any previously retained counsel to 
provide case file and other documents whose pre-
paration had been covered by prior representation. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
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205 Husband and Wife 
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205 Husband and Wife 
205X Enticing and Alienating 
205k323 Right of Action 
205k325 k. By Wife. Most Cited Cases 
Right to recover for alienation of affections now 
extends to both spouses equally and, rather than be-
ing based on premise that either spouse constitutes 
the "property" of the other, is based on the premise 
that each spouse has a valuable interest in the mar-
riage relationship, including its intimacy, compan-
ionship, support, duties, and affection. 
[7] Husband and Wife 205 €^>322 
205 Husband and Wife 
205X Enticing and Alienating 
205k322 k. Nature and Form of Remedy. 
Most Cited Cases 
A suit for alienation of affections does not attempt 
to "preserve" or "protect" a marriage from interfer-
ence, but serves only to compensate a spouse who 
has sustained loss and injury to his or her marital 
relationship through the intentional interference of 
a third party. 
[8] Husband and Wife 205 €==>323.1 
205 Husband and Wife 
205X Enticing and Alienating 
205k323 Right of Action 
205k323.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 205k323) 
Even if some alienation actions are motivated 
primarily by spite or extortion, there is no basis on 
which to abolish cause of action altogether, since a 
plaintiff who institutes a groundless or collusive 
suit is subject to a suit or counterclaim for abuse of 
process or malicious prosecution, and there can be 
no recovery against a defendant whose conduct is 
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Before Judges Thorne, Davis, and Orme* 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Plaintiffs Lonnie Paulos and Advanced Orthopedics & Sports 
Medicine, LLC (Paulos) argue that the trial court abused its 
discretion in dismissing this case with prejudice after Paulos's 
attorney, Richard S* Nemelka, failed to appear on the first day 
Ot the scheduled bench trial, Defendants All My Sons Moving and 
Storage, S&B Storage, and John Siddoway argue that dismissal was 
a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion,1 We reverse 
and remand. 
1* Defendants initially argue that we do not have jurisdiction^ 
to hear this nase due to an untimely appeal. The final orders in 
this case were issued January 8, 2008. See generally Promax Dev. 
Corp, v, Raile, 2000 UT 4, If 15, 998 P.2d 254 ("[A] trial court 
must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a party 
before the judgment becomes final for the purposes of an appeal 
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3."). Three days later, 
Paulos filed a motion for a new trial, which tolls the time for 
appeal. See Hume v. Small Claims Court. 590 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah 
1979). The district court denied that motion on February 21, 
2008, and Paulos filed a notice of appeal on February 29, 20l)b\ 
Thus, the appeal is timely and we have jurisdiction to hear it. 
"It is well established that under Rule 41(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court has the discretion to 
dismiss an action with prejudice for failure to prosecute without 
justifiable excuse.'1 Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, 11 28, 46 
P.3d 753 (footnote omitted); see also Utah R. civ. P. 41(b) ("For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these 
rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal 
of an action or of any claim against hind."). Paulos did not meet 
his burden of giving a justifiable excuse for Mr, Nemelka's 
failure to appear* Mr. Nemelka was present when the trial date 
was rescheduled Lo start November 5, 2007, and he cannot rely on 
subsequent pleadings generated by him that simply perpetrated his 
mistake, Mr. Nemelka was also aware that there was a discrepancy 
between when he thought the trial would start and when opposing 
counsel thought the trial would start. This was sufficient to 
put Mr. Nemelka on notice and require some action on his part to 
directly confirm the correct date with the trial court. Thus, 
the trial court had discretion to dismiss the case under rule 
41(b). 
"However, the trial court's discretion 'must be balanced 
against' the priority of 'afford[ing] disputants an opportunity 
to be heard and to do justice between them.'" Rohan, 2002 UT App 
109, i! 28 (alteration in original) (quoting Maxfield v. Rushton, 
779 P*2d 237, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). To deLermine whether 
the trial court abused such discretion, we consider five factors: 
"(1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the 
opportunity each party has had to move the 
case forward; (3) what each of the parties 
has done to move the case forward; (4) what 
difficulty or prejudice may have been caused 
to the other side; and (5) most important, 
whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal." 
Id. (quoting Maxfield, 779 P,2d at 239). 
Defendants argue that the first three factors support 
dismissal because while Defendants were diligently moving the 
case forward to trial/ including one of Defendants1 attorneys 
forgoing a trip to avoid further postponing trial, Mr. Nemelka 
created several delays. These alleged delays include once 
changing the date of depositions due to a scheduling conflict; 
later scheduling a hearing to stop those depositions from 
occurring; failing to appear at the hearing on the contested 
depositions due to a scheduling conflict; delaying a Response Lo 
a summary judgment motion based on the depositions; initially 
requesting a later trial date because of a conflict with his 
personal activities; and failing to appear on the first day of 
trial. The majority of these actions are familiar delays in 
litigation, and we are not convinced that these actions were 
20080196-CA 2 
particularly egregious and show that Paulos "'had ample 
opportunity to litigate [his] case . . . but abused such 
opportunity.'" gee id. n 32 (quoting Hill v, Dickerson, 839 P.2d 
309, 312 <Utah Ct. App. 1992)), Moreover, the trial court, which 
did not explain in its initial order why it chose the harsh 
sanction of dismissal with prejudice, only mentioned as dilatory 
actions that Mr. Nemelka did not appear on the first day of trial 
and that the trial had previously been rescheduled at his 
request. Indeed, although the later order denying Paulosls 
motion to set aside the dismissal was originally drafted by 
Defendants to characterise Mr. Nemelka's actions as "multiple 
delays and recklessness in conducting this litigation," the trial 
court edited the phrase to simply read "delays in conducting this 
litigation," 
As to the fourth factor, Defendants claim that they would 
have been prejudiced by postponing trial because they would have 
needed to subpoena all of their witnesses again and prepare for 
trial a second time. Assuming that three days were required for 
the trial, this assertion is true. However, that prejudice could 
have been mitigated by holding the bench trial during the two 
scheduled days that Mr. Nemelka was prepared to attend, taking 
witnesses out of order if necessary, and continuing only one day 
of the trial to a later date if that proved necessary.^ And any 
monetary cost o£ such a solution could have been reclaimed 
through an appropriate award of attorney fees and costs. 
Defendants also argue that they would have suffered prejudice 
because there is a proceeding in Delaware involving one of 
Defendants and that proceeding "depends on the outcome in this 
case." But Defendants do no more than allege this as prejudice 
and do not explain how the existence of this separate proceeding 
would equate to suffering prejudice via a postponement in this 
case. It is therefore impossible for us to weigh this claim of 
prejudice. 
The final and most important factor is the injustice that 
may result from dismissal. The injustice to Paulos here is 
particularly heavy, leaving him without his day in court and with 
no avenue of relief against Defendants. Thus, when combining the 
factors, considering the relatively routine nature of most of the 
complained of delays, the extent to which the prejudice to 
Defendants may have been cured by an appropriate award of 
attorney fees and costs, and the severe injustice to Paulos 
resulting from a dismissal, wo conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion in dismissing Paulos's case with prejudice-
Thus, we reverse the dismissal and remand for further 
proceedings. 
Paulos also contests the trial court's award of attorney 
fees. When a party fails to appear, the trial court may award 
attorney fees under its authority to control proceedings before 
it. See Utah Code Ann, § 78A-2-201 (Supp. 2008); Barnard v. 
20080196-CA 3 
Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) (B[C]ourts of general 
jurisdiction . . . possess certain inherent power to impose 
monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their uuuduct thwart the 
court's scheduling and movement of cases through the court.").2 
Such an award, however, should only be the amount necessary "to 
compensate for the delay, inconvenience, and expense resulting 
from [the offending lawyer]'s behavior*" Barnard, 855 P.2d at 
248; see also Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78, U 14, 985 P.2d 
255. We see no authority for the trial court awarding attorney 
fees not limited to those incurred as a result of Mr. Nemelka's 
nonappearance.3 For example, had the case gone to trial and 
Defendants prevailed, based upon the pleadings Defendants would 
not have been entitled to any attorney fees. Similarly, had we 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal with prejudice, thex** would 
be no attorney fees awardable as a result of the nonappearance; 
indeed, in that scenario, Defendants would have spent less money 
defending the suit than if Mr. Nemelka had appeared as scheduled. 
But because we reverse the dismissal of the case, Defendants will 
have to further defend the case and attorney fees may be awarded 
to compensate for those fees and costs resulting directly from 
Mr. Nemelka's nonappearance. These fees and costs should be 
calculated in light of the fact that trial was scheduled for the 
following two days, Mr. Nemelka was prepared to appear on those 
two days, and the monetary cost resulting from Mr* Nemelkars 
nonappearance could have been mitigated by holding trial those 
two days, resulting in lower attorney fees and costs than would 
have been incurred by cancelling the trial in its entirety. We 
therefore reverse the award of all attorney fees and costs, and 
we remand this matter to the trial court for an award of attorney 
2m we recognize that the trial court initially categorized its 
award of attorney fees as fees awarded because the matter was 
without merit. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825(l) 
(Supp. 2008) (providing for an award of attorney fees when action 
is without merit and not brought in good faith)- However, the 
trial court later clarified that no one had alleged that Mr. 
Nemelka's nonappearance was in bad faith, that the court nha[d] 
made no ruling that [Paulas]'s case is without merit," and that 
the fees were awarded pursuant to the trial court'a authority to 
control the proceedings before it. 
3 * Defendants' attorneys initially requested only attorney fees 
"for having to get ready and be here today" and "for trial 
preparations „ , - done in the last 48 hours." 
20080196-CA 4 
fees and costs limited to those directly resulting from Mr, 
Nemelka's nonappearance on the first day of trial.4 
James Z, Davis, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Gregory K- Orme, Judge 
4* Defendants' cursory request for attorney fees based on 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Joseph W. ROHAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Chad BOSEMAN, a minor; and Jerald Boseman, an 
individual, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20001148-CA. 
April 11,2002. 
Rehearing Denied May 6, 2002. 
Automobile accident victim appealed from order of 
the District Court, Third District, Salt Lake Depart-
ment, J. Dennis Frederick, J., dismissing his negli-
gence action with prejudice and awarding costs and 
fees to defendants. The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
Associate P.J., held that: (1) trial court acted within 
its discretion in denying automobile accident vic-
tim's request for a continuance; (2) trial court did 
not exceed its discretion in denying automobile ac-
cident victim's motions for a voluntary dismissal; 
(3) trial court's denial of automobile accident vic-
tim's motions did not violate Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA); (4) trial court did not exceed 
its discretion in dismissing automobile accident vic-
tim's action with prejudice; (5) accident victim's 
motions were frivolous and without basis in law or 
fact; and (6) sufficient evidence supported trial 
court's finding that automobile accident victim ac-
ted in bad faith. 
Affirmed. 
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award of attorney fees, where accident victim indic-
ated that he was ready for trial, then later dismissed 
counsel and sought more experienced counsel with-
in weeks of trial, and, appearing pro se, appeared 
for trial without witnesses and unprepared to pro-
ceed. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-56. 
*754 Joseph W. Rohan, Halliday & Watkins, PC, 
Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se. 
*755 Mark S. Gustavson, Sandy, and Robert L. 
Jeffs and Rodney W. Rivers, Jeffs & Jeffs, Provo, 
for Appellees. 
Before JACKSON, P.J., and BILLINGS, Associate 
P.J. and DAVIS, J. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
^ 1 Joseph W. Rohan (Rohan) appeals the trial 
court's dismissal of his negligence action and award 
of attorney fees and costs to Chad and Gerald Bose-
man (the Bosemans). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 In January 1997, Rohan suffered head injuries 
in a vehicular accident involving Chad Boseman. In 
April 1997, Rohan learned he had a closed brain in-
jury. 
K 3 Following the accident, Rohan, a licensed Utah 
attorney, continued to practice law with Halliday & 
Watkins, P.C. In early 1998, Rohan retained Halli-
day & Watkins to represent him in a negligence ac-
tion against the Bosemans. On April 23, 1998, Ro-
han, through Halliday & Watkins, filed a com-
plaint. Thereafter, the parties proceeded to conduct 
settlement negotiations and discovery. In an August 
1999 letter, Rohan, through Halliday & Watkins, 
informed the Bosemans that he intended to termin-
ate settlement negotiations and proceed to trial. 
K 4 On October 28, 1999, a year and a half after Ro-
han's complaint was filed, the trial court issued an 
order to show cause as to why Rohan's action 
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
Following a hearing in Novembei 1999, the trial 
court continued the order to show cause for sixty 
days. 
H 5 On January 19, 2000, Rohan, through Halliday 
& Watkins, filed a certificate of readiness for trial. 
The Bosemans objected arguing, inter alia, that Ro-
han had failed to provide documents requested in 
discovery, and consequently, they had been unable 
to complete Rohan's deposition. They requested 
120 days to complete discovery. 
| 6 In a conference on March 2, 2000, the trial 
court scheduled a final pretrial conference for June 
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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5 and trial for June 20-23, 2000. The court ordered 
the parties to complete discovery by May 26, 2000. 
If 7 After the scheduling conference, the Bosemans 
filed a motion to compel production of the docu-
ments they had previously requested from Rohan. 
The motion was granted. Later in March, both 
parties designated trial witnesses and exhibits. Ro-
han's designations were through Halliday & 
Watkins and included medical experts. 
t 8 Sometime in March 2000, Rohan concluded that 
Halliday & Watkins lacked the experience to try his 
case. Thus, he retained Robert Orton (Orton) of Fa-
bian & Clendenin, P.C. In March and April, Orton 
attended supplemental depositions; in May, he ex-
amined medical records at the office of the Bose-
mans' counsel. However, Orton never filed a formal 
appearance in Rohan's action. 
If 9 A week before the final pretrial conference, Or-
ton informed Rohan that he could not depose ex-
perts in time for trial and he would not represent 
Rohan without a continuance. Thus, on June 2, 
2000, Rohan filed a pro se motion to continue trial 
for ninety days and to extend discovery for sixty 
days so that Orton could "identify supplemental ex-
pert and fact witnesses," "conduct further discov-
ery," and prepare for trial. In the motion, Rohan 
also sought the withdrawal of Holliday & Watkins 
and to substitute Orton as counsel. 
If 10 At the final pretrial conference on June 5, 
2000, Halliday & Watkins appeared on Rohan's be-
half. The trial court took Rohan's motion to contin-
ue under advisement, but instructed the parties and 
counsel to prepare for trial. Later that day, the court 
denied the continuance because Rohan had failed to 
establish good cause as required by Utah law and 
FN1 because, under the circumstances, fifteen days 
before trial was too late to substitute counsel. 
FN1. The motion to continue and substi-
tute counsel was actually filed eighteen 
days before trial. 
Page 5 
f 11 On June 6, 2000, Rohan filed a pro se notice of 
discharge and discharged Halliday & Watkins. The 
next day, he filed a pro se motion for a voluntary 
dismissal, arguing he *756 lacked counsel and it 
would be manifestly unfair to require him to try his 
own brain injury case. The Bosemans opposed the 
motion arguing, inter alia, Rohan voluntarily dis-
charged his counsel, he could not claim surprise 
with respect to his counsels' lack of experience, and 
they would suffer prejudice if Rohan's motion were 
granted. The trial court summarily denied the mo-
tion for the reasons specified in the Bosemans' ob-
jection. 
t 12 On June 15, 2000, Rohan filed a notice of in-
ability to bring his case to trial. The Bosemans re-
sponded that unless otherwise informed by the 
court, they would continue to prepare for trial. On 
June 19, 2000, the day before trial, Rohan filed a 
renewed motion for a continuance and voluntary 
dismissal, arguing the trial court's refusal to grant 
the renewed motion would violate the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
^ 13 Rohan appeared pro se at trial. At the outset, 
the court denied the renewed motion, concluding 
Rohan's assertion that the ADA required the court 
to grant a continuance or voluntary dismissal was 
without basis in law and fact. Rohan informed the 
court that he did not have any witnesses and was 
not prepared to proceed. Consequently, the Bose-
mans made a motion to dismiss the case with preju-
dice for failure to prosecute. The trial court granted 
the motion and awarded the Bosemans' attorney 
fees and costs incurred as a result of Rohan's 
"willful failure or refusal" to proceed with trial. 
Tf 14 On August 7, 2000, Rohan filed a pro se mo-
tion for a new trial, primarily asserting the dis-
missal with prejudice violated the ADA, but also 
asserting the dismissal violated the United States 
and Utah Constitutions. The trial court denied the 
motion. Rohan appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
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[1] f 15 Rohan argues the trial court erred in deny-
ing his motions for a continuance and voluntary 
dismissal and in dismissing his case with prejudice 
for failure to prosecute. We review these actions of 
the trial court for abuse of discretion. See Brown v. 
Glover. 2000 UT 89,1 43, 16 P.3d 540; Harmon v 
Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639-40 (Utah 1979); 
Maxfleld v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). 
[2] H 16 Rohan also argues he was entitled to a con-
tinuance or dismissal without prejudice under the 
ADA. He additionally argues the denial of his mo-
tions violates his right to due process and equal 
protection under the United States and Utah Consti-
tutions. These issues present questions of law that 
we review for correctness. See, e.g., State v Mast, 
2001 UT App 40241 7-8, 40 P.3d 1143. 
[3] If 17 Finally, Rohan argues the trial court erred 
in awarding attorney fees and costs to the Bose-
mans. Whether attorney fees are recoverable in the 
present case is a question of law that we review for 
correctness. See, e.g., Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 
2000 UT 1024 21, 20 P.3d 868. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Did the Trial Court Exceed Its Discretion in 
Denying Rohan's Motions for a Continuance and 
Voluntary Dismissal? 
If 18 Rohan first argues the trial court exceeded its 
discretion in denying his initial motion for a con-
tinuance. In relevant part, Rule 40 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "the court 
may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may 
be just, ... postpone a trial ... upon good cause 
shown." Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b). 
[4] Tf 19 We conclude the trial court acted within its 
discretion in denying Rohan's initial motion for a 
continuance, which was based solely upon his de-
sire for more experienced counsel. Rohan was 
aware that he had a brain injury from the outset, yet 
he proceeded through his firm, Halliday & Watkins, 
for more than two years. Then, in March 2000, he 
concluded he needed more experienced counsel. In 
November 1999, the trial court put Rohan on notice 
that he must prosecute his case. This is when Rohan 
should have decided who would represent him. In-
stead, Rohan waited until eighteen days before trial, 
over two years after he filed his complaint, to re-
quest a continuance and to formally substitute 
counsel. Rohan has not offered a reasonable ex-
planation for *757 his dilatory conduct. Under 
these circumstances, we cannot sa> the trial court 
exceeded its discretion in denying a continuance. 
Cf. Hardy v. Hardy, 116 P.2d 917, 926 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989) (concluding trial court did not act un-
reasonably in denying continuance where prosecu-
tion of case had been substantially delayed by fail-
ure to agree upon expert witnesses and retain new 
counsel). 
[5] f 20 Rohan next argues the trial court exceeded 
its discretion in denying his renewed motion for a 
continuance and motions for a voluntary dismissal 
because it is manifestly unjust to force a party with 
a brain injury to try his own case. In relevant part, 
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that "an action may only be dismissed at 
the request of the plaintiff on order of the court 
based either on: (i) a stipulation of all of the parties 
who have appeared in the action; or (ii) upon such 
terms and conditions as the court deems proper." 
UtahR. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). 
If 21 In assessing whether the trial court exceeded 
its discretion, Rohan contends we should adopt the 
analysis of the Tenth Circuit. In the Tenth Circuit, 
"[ajbsent 'legal prejudice' to the defendant, the 
[trial] court normally should grant such a dis-
missal." Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 
(10th Cir.1997). "[Relevant factors the [trial] court 
should consider include: the opposing party's effort 
and expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay 
and lack of diligence on the part of the movant; in-
sufficient explanation of the need for a dismissal; 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dennis V. SPENCER and Linda S. Spencer, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
PLEASANT VIEW CITY, a Utah municipality; 
Cherrywood Manor, Inc., a Utah corporation; 
Cherrywood Manor Home Owners Association, 
Inc., a Utah corporation; and John and Jane Does I-
XX, individual defendants in their private capacit-
ies, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20010927-CA. 
Nov. 6,2003. 
Landowners denied request for approval of a subdi-
vision and building permits sued city, alleging 
slander of title and various state and federal consti-
tutional violations. The Second District Court, Og-
den Department, W. Brent West, J., granted sum-
mary judgment for city, and landowners appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Billings, A.P.J., held that: 
(1) landowners were not the prevailing party, for 
purposes of attorney fees, as a result of city's offer 
to issue building permits after commencement of 
action; (2) landowners did not have a protected 
property interest for due process purposes as a res-
ult of variances issued 10 years earlier; and (3) 




[1] Civil Rights 78 €^>1482 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78kl477 Attorney Fees 
78kl482 k. Results of Litigation; Prevail-
ing Parties. Most Cited Cases 
Landowners were not "prevailing parties" on their 
federal constitutional claims for equitable relief in 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
Pagel 
action against city, for purposes of an attorney fee 
award under statute allowing such fees on section 
1983 claims; though landowners had claimed city 
violated Constitution by failing to issue building 
permits, city offered to issue building permits after 
landowners sued city, and trial court found the offer 
rendered landowners' claims moot, trial court did 
not approve, adopt or ratify city's offer in any offi-
cial manner, and city's change in conduct lacked the 
necessary judicial imprimatur. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1983,1988. 
[21 Civil Rights 78 €=>1482 
78 Civil Rights 
78TIT Federal Remedies in General 
78kl477 Attorney Fees 
78k 1482 k. Results of Litigation; Prevail-
ing Parties. Most Cited Cases 
Attorney fees may be claimed by a party in a sec-
tion 1983 action under the theory that the party suc-
ceeded on a non-federal claim pendent to a substan-
tial constitutional claim and which arises from a 
common nucleus of operative fact. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1983, 1988. 
[3] Civil Rights 78 € ^ 1 4 8 2 
78 Civil Rights 
781II Federal Remedies in General 
78kl477 Attorney Fees 
78kl482 k. Results of Litigation; Prevail-
ing Parties. Most Cited Cases 
A party can "prevail" for purposes of statute allow-
ing attorney fees on constitutional claims under 
section 1983 only where there is a judicially sanc-
tioned change in the legal relationship of the 
parties, as with enforceable judgments on the merits 
and court-ordered consent decrees. 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1988. 
[4] Civil Rights 78 € ^ 1 4 8 2 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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involves some claim that the [municipality] ex-
ceeded, abused or 'distorted' its legal authority in 
some manner, often for some allegedly perverse 
(from the developer's point of view) reason. It is 
not enough simply to give these state law claims 
constitutional labels such as 'due process' or 
'equal protection' in order to raise a substantial 
federal question under section 1983." 
Id. at If 25 (quoting Creative Environments, Inc v. 
Estabrook. 680 F 2d 822, 833 (1st Cir.1982)). Ad-
ditionally, "absent invidious discrimination, such as 
proof of racial animus, the 'conventional planning 
dispute ... is a matter primarily of concern to the 
state and does not implicate the Constitution.' " Id. 
(quoting Creative Environments. Inc., 680 F.2d at 
833). 
[10] f 18 The Spencers have not alleged invidious 
discrimination by the City. Rather, the Spencers ar-
gue their original variances warrant federal protec-
tion in that "[variances run with the land,"Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4) (1998), and are not sub-
ject to revocation. This argument is merely a " 
'conventional planning dispute.' " Patterson. 2003 
UT 7 at \ 25 (quoting Creative Environments, Inc., 
680 F.2d at 833). Further, the Spencers have not 
identified a protected property interest to which 
they are entitled. While the Spencers and the Park-
ers obtained variances to build on their properties, 
neither sought to build until nearly ten years after 
the variances were granted. We have "uncovered no 
authority that suggests a property owner has a ves-
ted property right in a contemplated development or 
subdivision." Marshall v Board of County 
Comm'rs, 912 F.Supp. 1456, 1464 (D.Wyo.1996). 
Moreover, the Spencers' argument, taken to its lo-
gical conclusion, would allow property owners who 
fail to act for many years on a granted variance to 
frustrate a city's ability to update its land use regu-
lations. 
f^ 19 The Spencers' case "involves disputes about 
specific local development issues, not about the 
deprivation of constitutional rights." Patterson, 
2003 UT 7 at | 28. "Whatever unfairness [the Spen-
Page8 
cers] may have experienced, nothing in the facts 
presented sounds constitutional alarm bells." Id. at 
FN7 If 28. Thus, we conclude the Spencers failed to 
establish a property interest protected under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of the City. 
FN 7. We limit our holding to the specific 
facts of this case. We cannot say there will 
never be a case in which an adverse muni-
cipal land use decision against a developer 
rises to the level of a constitutional viola-
tion. However, the facts of this case do not 
warrant constitutional protection. 
III. Federal Takings Claim Inadequately Briefed 
[11][12][13] 1 20 The Spencers' federal takings 
claim is inadequately briefed, and we refuse to con-
sider it. "It is well established that a reviewing 
court will not address arguments that are not ad-
equately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
305 (Utah 1998). 
In deciding whether an argument has been ad-
equately briefed, we look to ...*552rule 24(a)(9) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure^ 
which] states that the argument in the appellant's 
brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons 
of the appellant with respect to the issues presen-
ted ... with citations to the authorities, statutes 
and parts of the record relied on.'" Implicitly, rule 
24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to author-
ity but development of that authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority.... 
[T]his court is not a depository in which the ap-
pealing party may dump the burden of argument 
and research. 
Id. at 305 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
If 21 Incorrectly labeling their claim as "substantive 
due process," the Spencers inadequately assert a 
federal "taking" without just compensation. In curs-
ory fashion, the Spencers argue that a platting error 
by the City, regarding a right-of-way owned by the 
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Spencers limiting use of that right-of-way, involved 
a private rather than public use. Aside from a one 
sentence quotation to a 1937 takings case, the Spen-
cers cite no case law describing or supporting their 
claim. There is no reasoned analysis or factual de-
velopment supporting any legal claim for damages, 
thus "dump[ing] the burden of argument and re-
search" on this court. Id. (quotations and citation 
omitted). Similarly, the Spencers claim the City's 
"actions were not related to [its] rationale proffered 
for conduct." However, the Spencers make no men-
tion of damages or constitutional remedies. The 
Spencers reference several instances of the City's 
conduct regarding the Spencers' development at-
tempts without any meaningful discussion of these 
facts or reasoned analysis as to why the City's con-
duct amounts to a constitutional taking. Citing one 
regulatory takings case, the Spencers superficially 
claim the facts are similar to this case, with no fur-
ther analysis or mention of the elements of a regu-
latory takings. Therefore, the federal takings claim 
fails. 
FN 8. The Spencers' cursory and conclus-
ory arguments that the City violated Art-
icle 1, Section 7; Article 1, Section 22; and 
Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitu-
tion also fail for inadequate briefing. 
IV. Slander of Title 
f 22 The Spencers argue that their slander of title 
claim against the City should have survived sum-
mary judgment. The trial court dismissed this claim 
because, inter alia, the Spencers failed to establish a 
"factual or legal basis" for their assertions. The 
Spencers do not argue a cognizable claim on ap-
peal, and we therefore affirm the trial court's ruling. 
[14][15] U 23"To prove slander of title, a claimant 
must [show] that (1) there was a publication of a 
slanderous statement disparaging [the] claimant's 
title, (2) the statement was false, (3) the statement 
was made with malice, and (4) the statement caused 
actual or special damages." First Sec. Bank of Utah 
v. Banbeny Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1256-57 
(Utah 1989). In their brief, the Spencers refer to 
"collective city statements" that "denigrated the 
validity of Spencers' real property," but do not 
provide any details about those statements or how 
they satisfy the first element. For the second ele-
ment, the Spencers assert in conclusory fashion that 
the City's statements "were false." In asserting 
malice, the Spencers cite the standard but do not 
apply it to the facts, arguing only that, "taken in 
context," the statements were malicious. The Spen-
cers also inadequately argue special damages. Thus, 
the Spencers' slander of title claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
\ 24 We conclude the Spencers are not entitled to 
"prevailing party" attorney fees. Further, the Spen-
cers fail to articulate any legitimate constitutional 
claims against the City. The Spencers' slander of 
title claim also fails. Therefore, we affirm. 
1 25 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Presiding Judge and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., 
Judge. 
UtahApp.,2003. 
Spencer v. Pleasant View City 
80 P.3d 546, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 2003 UT App 
379 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Donald Wayne BROWN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900148. 
Nov. 30, 1992. 
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1993. 
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Box 
Elder County, Franklin L. Gunnell, J., of second-de-
gree murder and aggravated assault. Defendant ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: 
(1) business owner had authority to consent to 
search of trailer used to house defendant; (2) ap-
pointment of part-time prosecutor as defense coun-
sel warranted new trial; (3) admission of prior bad 
acts evidence was not plain error; and (4) evidence 
was sufficient to support conviction for aggravated 
assault. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., concurred with opinion. 
Hall, C.J., dissented with opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law 110 €=^1030(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
1 10XXIV Review 
]1 0XX1V(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
n0XXIV(E)l In General 
110k 1030 Necessity of Objections in 
General 
110k 103 0(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Supreme Court uses plain error standard to review 
issues raised for first time on appeal. 
Page 1 
[2] Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 1 7 4 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349 V Waiver and Consent 
349kl73 Persons Giving Consent 
349kl74 k. Owners of Property; Hosts 
and Guests. Most Cited Cases 
Business owner had authority to consent to search 
of trailer used to house defendant; trailer had 
"common area" used by all employees of business, 
owner had unrestricted right of access to at least 
common area in trailer, all items seized were in 
plain sight, none were hidden and none were in area 
in sole possession of defendant. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amcnd. 4. 
[3] Criminal Law 110 €^1130(6) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(I) Briefs 
HOkl 130 In General 
1 lOkl 130(6) k. Reply Briefs. Most 
Cited Cases 
Defendant's failure to include state constitutional 
analysis in his opening brief (and state's subsequent 
failure to include such analysis in its response 
brief) precluded review of state constitutional ana-
lysis added to defendant's response brief; otherwise, 
state would be placed in difficult position in future 
cases of either missing opportunity to brief state 
constitutional law issue or having to construct and 
then rebut an unbriefed issue. 
[4] Searches and Seizures 349 C ^ 2 4 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k24 k. Necessity of and Preference for 
Warrant, and Exceptions in General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Warrantless searches are per se um'easonable unless 
undertaken pursuant to recognized exception to 
warrant requirement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0 0 O 0 0 — — 
State o£ Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wolfgango Ruiz, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
AMENDED OPINION1 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20071003-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 7, 2009) 
2009 UT A P P 121 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 051906181 
The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy 
Attorneys: Hakeem Ishola, West Valley City, for Appellant 
Mark L» Shurtleff and Laura B- Dupaix, Salt Lake 
city, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
HI Wolfgango Ruiz timely sought to withdraw his guilty plea. 
His motion was granted. On reconsideration by a different judge, 
that disposition was rescinded and the motion was denied. W^ 
reverse that denial. 
1. This Amended Opinion replaces our Opinion issued on December 
26, 2008, see State v. Ruiz, 2008 UT App 470, 620 Utah Adv. Rep, 
41. We address the State's arguments raised in its petition for 
rehearing, see infra !1F 16-23/ and decline to delete the language 
to which the State takes exception for the reasons outlined in 
the final section of this opinion. fif-Q ffl-.ah "R. App. p. ?5fc) 
("If a petition for rehearing is granted, the court may make a 
final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may restore 
j.t to the caienaar tor rearguift&flt ar resuomxssionr or m^y make""* 
"such_other. orders as are deemed appropriate under the 
circumstances __of the particular caJ5'ST;Tr» ASlfife from -chis ~ 
explanatory footnote, our opinion resolving this appeal remains 
exactly the same except for the addition of the section entitled 
"On Petition for Rehearing." 
v^l G& 
01/04/2006 20:18 14356572935 WRNSEARLE PAGE 01-'02 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
( N o t F o r O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
C a s e NO* 2 0 0 8 0 7 5 8 - C A 
F I L E D (May 1 4 , 2 0 0 9 ) 
2009 UT App 129i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Chris Wall and Tara Wall, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
Tamer a Palmer, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Fourth District, Nephi Department, 080600135 
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre Jr. 
Attorneys: Tamera Palmer, Nephi, Appellant Pro Se 
Chris Wall and Tara Wall, Payson, Appellees Pro Se 
Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Orme* 
PER CURIAM: 
Tamera Palmer appeals the district court's August 26, 2008 
judgment. We affirm* 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires,, among other things, that all appellate brief3 submitted 
contain a table of contents, a table of authoritiesr a statement 
of jurisdiction, a statement of the issues presented for appeal, 
including the, standard of^appellate review with supporting 
authority, and proper citations to the record. See Utah R, App. 
P- 24(a), Rule 24(a)(9) also requires that all appellate briefs 
contain prope.i^Xftynl apaiysijj with cxtations to relev^t legal— 
authority supporting the" a-rqfcrrftjifp T-PM*#*H h^or^ -ir. Q,aQ id. R. 
24(a)(9). 
An appellate ^ ourt is nbt a depository in which parties may 
dump the burden of their argument and research* See Smith v. 
Four Corners Mental Health Cfcr., inc. 2003 UT 23, 11 46, 70 P.3d 
904. The appellant, in his br her brief, bears the burden o£ 
demonstrating wxtn"appropriate legal argument that the district 
court erred,.. See State v. Pkrice. 827 P.2d 2*47. 250 /Utah ct. 
App. 1992). This court may decline to consider the merits of an "*> 
appeal if a P^ty falls to cite relevant JLegal authority and also £ ^f-
f ails_toprb^jLdQ~meaiii.ncrful legal analvaia pertaining to the * J 
facts of his or her case. See State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 
305, H 25, 989 P.2d 503. A^hough^Utak appellate courts are 
reluctant _to penalize self-::t;e^e3entedlitigaats foiFtechnical 
Tule^vlolatior^^ as"sume~a party[s burden of 
^arg{ffle5g^^ fi^ AlienorFriel, ^UOB irr~5T7~T~9T194 
.Thi^ cg^£t notified Palmer of -the briefing requirements.
 $ 
Despite this court's request that Palmer comply wit^thebrief ing 
requirements/ "Palmer_declined to file a proper brief. , Palmer' S~~ 
brief raises seven issues. However, her argument section.is 
limited to six paragraphs which do not pertain to the legal 
issues that she raises on appeal or satisfy her burden of 
convincing this court that the underlying court erred. Palmer's 
brief fails to raise any legal argument, which if well-taken, 
would entitle her to reversal of the district court's judgment. 
Accordingly, the* district court's August 26, 2008 judgment 
is affirmed. 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W, Bench, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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